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SYMPOSIUM
FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR COMPENSATION SYSTEMS
INTRODUCTION
OSCAR S. GRAY*
This Symposium is an outgrowth of a program presented in San
Francisco in January 1993 at the annual meeting of the Association
of American Law Schools by the AALS's Section on Torts and Com-
pensation Systems. It had occurred to me, as chairman of the Sec-
tion for the year, that the previous programs within recent memory
were all about torts, and not compensation systems. This led to a
program on Future Prospects for Compensation Systems, which I
had the honor to moderate, at which most of the participants in this
issue presented earlier versions of their present articles: Professors
O'Connell on motoring accidents;' Rabin on injuries from toxic
materials;2 Schwartz on industrial accidents;' and Weiler on acci-
dents in medical treatment.4 Professor Arlen, who is an economist
as well as a lawyer, provided a general discussion.5 In addition,
present in the audience were Professors Miller and Phillips, whose
experience with some of the emerging issues led to the inclusion of
* Jacob A. France Professor of Torts, University of Maryland School of Law; B.A.,
J.D., Yale University.
1. Jeffrey O'Connell et al., Consumer Choice in the Auto Insurance Market, 52 MD. L.
REV. 1016 (1993).
2. Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compen-
sation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951 (1993).
3. Gary T. Schwartz, Waste, Fraud, and Abuse in ll'orkers' Compensation: The Recent Cali-
fornia Experience, 52 MD. L. REV. 983 (1993).
4. Paul C. Weiler, The Case for No-Fault Medical Liability', 52 MD. L. REV. 908 (1993).
5. Jennifer H. Arlen, Compensation Systems and Efficient Deterrence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1093
(1993).
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additional articles in this issue-Professor Miller's on new develop-
ments in the New Zealand compensation experiment6 and Professor
Phillips's on the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) as an alter-
native to workers' compensation. 7
There is no fixed definition of "compensation" systems. The
term alludes 'generally to concepts for the replacement of tort liabil-
ity in certain contexts with a statutory substitute. The pioneering
model was workers' compensation. Proposals along these lines usu-
ally share two characteristics: their criteria for compensability do
not purport to require that culpability be found on the part of the
injurer, although culpability may have limited secondary signifi-
cance in the context of certain definitional issues; and the measure
of damages permitted is less than that traditionally provided in tort,
for example, by restrictions on the availability of damages for non-
economic losses, or perhaps, for losses for which payments are
available from collateral sources. The "compensation" notion is
broad enough to cover both "liability" (or "third-person") and
"nonliability" (or "first-person") systems, that is, both systems in
which compensatory payments are made by or on behalf of injur-
ers-for example, workers' compensation-and those where the
payments are made by others, such as a state agency, or by the in-
jured person's own insurer, as in the case of "no-fault" motoring
insurance.
The papers in this collection are interesting, I think, apart from
the merits of the specific proposals they advance, for a few general
observations that may be drawn from them.
First, the idea of compensation systems as a preferred device
for managing the costs of at least certain types of accidents seems to
be alive and well among contemporary torts scholars. This appears
to be so despite a spate of recent revisionist legal history, which has
tended to promote the greater importance of negligence, as con-
trasted with enterprise liability, as a determining force in the devel-
opment of twentieth-century accident law. Professors Rabin8 and
Schwartz,9 indeed, are among the more prominent authors of such
works. Yet what we now see are proposals for a greater, not a lesser,
6. Richard S. Miller, An Analysis and Critique of the 1992 Changes to .Veu Zealand's Acci-
dent Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 1070 (1993).
7. JerryJ. Phillips, FELA Revisited, 52 MD. L. REV. 1063 (1993).
8. See Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinteipreta-
tion, 15 GA. L. REV. 925 (1981).
9. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA.
L. REV. 963 (1981).
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use of compensation schemes. Even the papers that are most criti-
cal of shortcomings in existing compensation schemes-Professor
Schwartz's and, in a sense, that of Professor O'Connell and his col-
leagues-do not suggest for a moment that it would be better for
such schemes to be abandoned in favor of conventional negligence.
Professor Schwartz, for instance, makes it clear that the waste,
fraud, and abuse that have manifested themselves in the California
workers' compensation program are not the result of it being a
workers' compensation program, but are instead attributable to
other factors. One such other factor is a specific feature of the Cali-
fornia scheme that need not and evidently should not be included in
such programs: that the cost of medical evaluation is compensable
even in the absence of a compensable injury or condition.'" An-
other such factor is the compensability in the California program of
injuries and conditions that are difficult to verify, which could be
fraudulently claimed as easily in tort, to the extent that they are
compensable in tort, as under compensation schemes."
Professor O'Connell's paper, similarly, should be understood
as addressing two separable issues. One is the question whether ex-
isting "no-fault" insurance schemes have proven successful in com-
parison with the negligence regimes they were designed to replace.
On this the results, as I read the paper, are in line with earlier stud-
ies. Schemes with weak "thresholds"--that is, barriers to tort liabil-
ity-accomplish little. Those with relatively strong thresholds, as in
New York, work well in terms of providing better personal injury
benefits-for society on the whole-than the tort system, for smaller
premiums. This is apparently the conclusion that the authors draw
from, for example, the comparison of New York and California rates
for the personal injury components of motoring policies, 12 and to
the best of my judgment the inference is plausible. No nostalgia
whatever is expressed for the pure tort system. But, faithful to the
charge to discuss the future of compensation schemes, the authors
have examined another problem, which the casual reader may de-
duce only indirectly. The age of legislative interest in automobile
"no-fault" schemes is over. The trend to enact such measures has
petered out. Evidently, as a matter of practical politics, benefits in
the magnitude achievable by the New York or Michigan model are
not sufficient to revive the necessary political interest in states that
have not already passed such laws. Dramatically increased savings
10. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 990-91.
11. Id. at 994.
12. O'Connell et al., supra note 1, at 1021-22.
1993] 895
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
might do so, and might, the authors seek to demonstrate, be achiev-
able through the total abolition of tort recovery, even for seriously
disabling injuries. Whether the trade-offs here make such proposals
desirable is fairly debatable. That this debate about a radical exten-
sion of the compensation regime does not suggest, however, rever-
sal of direction away from compensation systems, is entirely clear.
The most enthusiastic defense, in these papers, of a tort-like
system in preference to a compensation system is that of Professor
Phillips, for the FELA. Even here, it may be noted, Professor Phil-
lips does not propose a shift from an existing workers' compensa-
tion system back to normal tort law. He merely opposes the
abandonment of the FELA. That act, it should be recalled, itself
contains a number of changes from conventional negligence law
that in their own way represent a reform package, from the point of
view of injured workers, parallel to that provided by workers'
compensation. 13
Another observation is suggested by these papers: that the rea-
sons for interest in compensation schemes have shifted over the
years. Originally, in the development of workers' compensation, the
principal challenge was to overcome obstacles to the establishment
of the substantive grounds for liability in a negligence action-the
need to prove fault, to avoid the fellow-servant rule, to overcome
the defense of contributory negligence, and the like.14
The current proposals may reflect similar concerns, but they
seem to indicate a different ordering of motivating factors. One of
the newer preoccupations, for instance, is a desire to simplify claim-
ants' burdens on the issue of causation. This is discussed exten-
sively in Professor Rabin's paper and, to some extent, in Professor
Weiler's as well. Another contemporary emphasis is on cost con-
tainment as a primary goal. In workers' compensation itself, of
course, a limitation of the amount of liability-to specified economic
losses-became a familiar feature. This does not seem, however, to
have been viewed as a key reason for promoting that change from
tort law, 15 but rather as an incidental trade-off, thought to be useful
as a quid-pro-quo for constitutional purposes.' 6 By contrast the
13. See 3 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 11.2 n. 22 at 77 (2d ed.
1986).
14. See, e.g., I ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 4.30
(1992).
15. Id. See also excerpts from the Wainwright Commission report, quoted in Ives v.
South Buffalo Ry., 94 N.E. 431, 436-37 (N.Y. 1911).
16. Cf. New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
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suggestion, discussed in Professor Phillips's paper and adverted to
in Professor Schwartz's, that the industrial accidents of railroad and
maritime workers be shifted from the FELA to workers' compensa-
tion, appears to be motivated primarily by the desire to save money.
This suggestion comes from the employers, not the railroad or mar-
itime unions. Its motivation is not to broaden benefits. Professor
Weiler's suggestions on medical injuries, of course, are directed to
the correction of a broader range of social evils than merely the
costs of the health care system-for example, the undercompensa-
tion of many victims of malpractice. But a critical feature of his en-
tire formulation-and of the Clinton administration's overall health
care reform package, in the context of which his proposal has its
principal opportunity for consideration in the foreseeable future-is
cost containment. As noted above, Professor O'Connell's propos-
als, while also motivated by broader social concerns, are also deci-
sively shaped by the need to demonstrate cost containment as the
political key to any legislative action on further no-fault motoring
schemes.
These papers invite attention to other considerations of a gen-
eral nature: the uses and abuses of economic theory in the analysis
of legal issues; the value and limitations of empirical studies; and the
importance of the social context in which legal issues manifest
themselves.
Economic theory has, of course, become a staple of legal litera-
ture for more than a generation.' 7 Its implications for legal analysis
require very careful handling. Some lawyers-like Professor Arlen
who has a Ph.D. in economics-have the necessary training, as well
as sound legaljudgment. For those less seriously trained, however,
even very sophisticated non-specialists, it can be hazardous to dab-
ble casually with economic theory. The pitfalls are illustrated by an
episode in the development of a paper that I admire on the whole
very much, Professor Weiler's article on medical injuries. That pa-
per was strengthened, in my view, in the course of its completion, in
response to some of Professor Arlen's comments on the draft as
originally presented in San Francisco.
By way of background, Professor Weiler's proposals encom-
pass, as the reader will see, two major themes, which he thinks
should be linked and which I consider deserving of very careful con-
17. The participation of lawyers in the law-and-economics movement may be traced
to the appearance of Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
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sideration independently, regardless of whether they are linked.
One has to do with the possibility of compensating for the costs of
medical injuries by reference to descriptive criteria that resemble
those used in insurance to describe compensable events. This
would contrast with the reliance on fault as the basis for liability that
is embedded in malpractice law. Such suggestions have been made
by others during the past twenty-five years or so.' Many disagree.
For what it is worth, I find Professor Weiler's case persuasive that
we should at least pursue this possibility, examine it further, and
generally attempt to verify whether it is feasible. The most difficult
obstacle in the past-apart from the opposition of many doctors and
lawyers-has been in the difficulty of defining compensable events
in insurance language, so as to be sufficiently inclusive-that is, to
cover whatever medical injuries malpractice law would cover if it
functioned properly-without undertaking to pay for the failure of
good medical practice to cure. Professor Weiler reports encourag-
ing progress in the development of a technique for specifying "des-
ignated compensable events."' 9 Whether this progress is sufficient
to establish the likelihood of success is hard to tell. If it should
prove to be workable, it opens up possibilities not only along the
lines of Professor Weiler's integrated proposal, but also for no-fault
compensation on first-person or physician-liability models other
than Professor Weiler's.
The other aspect of his proposal has been called "organiza-
tional medical liability" or "enterprise liability." This plan would
shift the locus of liability from individual physicians to institutions
with which, or through which, they practice, such as hospitals,
health maintenance organizations, and whatever "managed care"
entities may emerge from the Clinton administration's initiative for
reforming American health care systems. The principal reasons for
examining these enterprise liability possibilities rest on a series of
assumptions about deterrence as a desirable and achievable objec-
tive of the system for managing medical accident costs. Professor
Weiler develops explanations to the effect that conventional mal-
practice liability does less than it might to encourage care because
physicians' liability is insured and premiums are not experience-
18. See, e.g., Clark v. Gibbons, 426 P.2d 525, 535, 539-40 (Cal. 1967) (Tobriner, J.,
concurring); Clark C. Havighurst & Laurence R. Tancredi, "ledicalAdversitv Insurance--
A No-Fault Approach to Medical Alalpractice and Quality Assurance, 51 MILBANK MEMORIAL
FUND Q. 125 (1973); Clark C. Havighurst, "Medical Adversity Insurance"-Has Its Time
Come?, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1233; cf. Robert E. Keeton, Compensation for MedicalAccidents, 121
U. PA. L. REV. 590 (1973).
19. See Weiler, supra note 4, at 933-35.
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rated. Professor Weiler attributes this problem to aspects of insur-
ance theory that are said to make the incidence of claims in the work
life of an individual physician an unsuitable basis for differential
charges. By contrast, he suggests, institutions responsible for more
events than are covered by one individual's practice may develop
the kind of loss experience that would be susceptible to differential
rating. This could provide financial incentives for risk management
in a way that would encourage care and help reduce avoidable
injuries.
There are further institutional reasons for interest in the "en-
terprise liability" aspect of the Weiler proposal, but they too are re-
lated to the deterrence objectives. One, which he does mention, has
to do with special problems in the organization and chaotic opera-
tion of hospitals. There are, for instance, many actors in hospitals
who can be negligent. One consequence is that in a conventional
malpractice case much is expended-and wasted from the point of
view of the claimant-in finger-pointing among the defendants. 20
This waste could be reduced if liability were centralized. Another
hospital problem poses a common threat: the responsibility for what
ought to be done for patients often falls in the cracks between unco-
ordinated jurisdictions. A stronger overall institutional responsibil-
ity for the costs of resulting injuries might encourage more
attention to reforms in systems management.
Professor Weiler has also made a more general point to the ef-
fect that a change from individual malpractice liability would afford
a more realistic alignment of liability with the emerging conditions
of practice, as more and more doctors are drawn into group ar-
rangements. There is a potential aspect to this that may merit de-
velopment in another paper. Increasingly, certain physicians are
being constrained in their techniques of practice by the preferences
of bureaucratic elements in the health care system. Insurers, for in-
stance, resist payment for the use of high-technology diagnostic de-
vices that neurologists consider important for proper practice.
Insurers are also developing programs in which patients are dis-
couraged from consulting doctors other than those who are "pre-
ferred" by the insurers. The insurers are suspected of excluding
from their preferred lists-and potentially from the ability to prac-
tice-those doctors whose methods the insurers consider undesir-
ably expensive, for example, those who prescribe the more modern
high-technology diagnostic procedures. Similar behavior may be
20. Id. at 916.
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expected in the future from the managers of competitive managed
care enterprises, unless they are made responsible for the costs of
their mistakes in such decisions. The individual doctor who omits to
provide what she considers to be the best treatment in these circum-
stances is probably not subject to conventional malpractice liability,
if the better treatment is not available because of the unavailability
of funding for it (unless perhaps there were virtually unanimous
professional agreement that the procedure should at least be pre-
scribed whether or not it can be paid for). But there is something to
be said for the proposition that he who decides not to fund what
physicians consider proper treatment should bear the risk of paying
for the costs of bad outcomes that could have been averted by the
professionally preferred treatment. It would follow that, as such de-
cisions increasingly fall to institutions under whose auspices physi-
cians practice, such liability should be borne by those institutions,
without regard to fault.
In any event, Professor Weiler's enterprise liability proposal is
predicated upon deterrence objectives. At the same time, he pro-
poses a number of cost-containment measures. This is a normal fea-
ture of compensation systems. Professor Weiler would, for
instance, eliminate the collateral-source rule, confine damages es-
sentially to economic loss, with "moderate" redress for loss of en-
joyment of life for the gravely disabled, and would limit
compensation for lost wages to two-thirds of the loss, up to a maxi-
mum based on the average wage in the jurisdiction (such as twice
the average wage), and subject to a two-month deductible.2'
Professor Arlen's discussion emphasizes the incoherence of loss
limitations such as the offset of collateral-source payments in the
context of a deterrence scheme, on the basis that the incentive for
safety imposed on an actor who can control risks should match the
cost of the harm caused by such risks (more or less). Professor Wei-
ler replies-and thereby strengthens his paper, in my view-not by
changing his proposal, but by changing his explanation for it. His
new explanation is that "this programmatic feature [the collateral-
source offset] is the only basis upon which medical no-fault could
possibly be entertained in the political arena."22 This strengthens
his proposal, I think, because he now at least gives a sensible reason
for the offset, which he did not do originally. Which brings us back
to the pitfalls of purported economic analysis.
21. Id. at 923-24.
22. Id. at.949.
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The reason originally given for the offset was "that loss insur-
ance is a considerably more accessible and efficient conduit for in-
jury redress than is a no-fault liability regime that requires judgment
about the cause of-if not the fault for-the injuries for which bene-
fits are sought."' 23 A similar argument is made for eliminating sub-
rogation rights of health insurers. "The justification . . . is that
making liability insurance secondary to loss insurance produces sav-
ings in overall insurance costs. Whereas no-fault workers' compen-
sation, for example, spends roughly twenty cents of each claims
dollar on administration, public and private health insurance spends
between five and ten cents of each claims dollar for this purpose. "24
The fallacy in each case is to confuse the advantages of keeping one
kind of claim entirely out of one insurance system-and entirely in
another-with the advantages or disadvantages of inter-system ad-
justments of claims that are inevitably in both systems. If any review
whatsoever is to be made of hospital records to identify adverse
events, if any determination is to be made about the compensability
of any part of a malpractice claim, for example, wage loss, the prin-
cipal administrative expenses of the liability system are already im-
plicated, whether there is subrogation or not. If, further, any claim
goes to the health insurer for costs associated with the condition in
the treatment of which a medical injury claim may arise, the admin-
istrative expenses of the health care system are already implicated
whether or not malpractice (or similar) liability is established.
There is no choice. There is no major savings to be made, no im-
portant efficiency to be achieved by preferring one system to an-
other thereafter. The only cost thereafter relevant to the decision
for or against subrogation (and hence against or for an offset for
collateral-source payments) is the cost of making adjustments be-
tween the insurers. This subrogation expense is the cost that should
be balanced against the impact on deterrence that flows from a deci-
sion to insulate the injurer-or not to do so-from the costs com-
pensated by collateral sources. It is not the supposed over-all
efficiencies of one kind of insurance or another that matters, even if
the decision were to be made solely on the basis of economics,
rather than practical politics.
I particularly admire Professor Weiler's empirical work, which
provides important explanations for the bulk of his recommenda-
tions. Here again a cautionary note may be sounded, albeit a very
23. Id. at 924 (emphasis in original).
24. Id. at 926.
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minor one. Not all conclusions that purport to be derived from em-
pirical studies are equally solidly grounded. Most of Professor Wei-
ler's conclusions from his data are persuasive, to me, but at least
one may go a shade beyond the evidence cited in its support. Pro-
fessor Weiler twice states, in effect, that "most . . . malpractice
claims are filed for the wrong cases." '25 He cites two sources in sup-
port. The first, in one of his books, is an analysis of data from the
monumental Harvard study of New York hospital records for which
he was responsible. 26 The data indeed cast doubt on a sizable
number of the claims analyzed. For a general conclusion, however,
that most malpractice claims are ill-founded, the support provided
by these data is subject to some qualification. For instance, the total
number of claims analyzed was forty-seven, a sample of doubtful
significance. Of this number, it is true that only eight passed the
screening criteria established in the study for a determination of
probable injury from negligence. The data are, indeed, consistent
with Professor Weiler's further conclusion that there may not even
have been an injury in most of the cases studied. Yet it could also be
said of eleven of the other cases that at least one reviewing physician
thought there was injury stemming from negligence, and of another
five cases (making a total of twenty-four of the forty-seven) that the
screening procedure was not an applicable test because the com-
plaint was of negligence outside the hospital that would not be ex-
pected to be recorded in the hospital chart. Accordingly, in a
majority of the cases, the data are not inconsistent with the proposi-
tion that malpractice could reasonably be suspected. The other
source relied upon was a study by a committee of anesthesiologists
of 1004 lawsuits against their colleagues. 27 This, of course, is a
much more impressive sample. Again there is ample, deplorable ev-
idence that many physicians are subjected to the trauma of litigation
over claims that most other comparably trained physicians consider
ill-founded. But, as support for the proposition that most malprac-
tice claims are unfounded, this too requires a little qualification.
"For the 869 cases in which the appropriateness of care could be
judged," the report states, "care was scored as appropriate in 46%
of cases and inappropriate or below standard in 54% of cases."12 8
As a comment on the Weiler paper, this is, of course, no more than
25. Id. at 913; see also id. at 918.
26. See PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE 71-72 (1993).
27. See Frederick W. Cheney et al., Standard of Care and Anesthesia Liabilitv, 261 JAMA
1599 (1989).
28. Id. at 1601.
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a trivial quibble. It is presented here merely as an example of the
care with which conclusions attributed to empirical studies generally
need to be treated, even in the context of scholarship of the highest
quality.
Of somewhat greater significance to the studies at hand is my
final point, on the importance of attention to social context in the
evaluation of proposals for law reform. Again I pick the Weiler pa-
per for an example, not because I consider it especially vulnerable
to criticism, but rather because I consider it especially interesting,
and especially likely to remain of enduring interest. Professor Wei-
ler has, as we have seen, chosen to link his no-fault compensation
proposal with his medical organization liability proposal, and has
done so explicitly for deterrence objectives. The context, however,
in which his proposals appear to have their greatest chance for con-
sideration is as part of the Clinton administration's health care re-
form package. While they have previously been advanced in
another theater, as part of a Reporters' Study sponsored by the
American Law Institute, the ALI has conspicuously omitted to en-
dorse any conclusions of that study. The work appears in print as a
report to the Institute, not of the Institute. The proposal acquired
new life-apart from its exposure in Professor Weiler's books and at
the AALS program-when it was discussed as potentially the "key
medical-liability reform" proposal of the President's Health Care
Task Force. 9 While the Task Force's interest in the proposal has
since been de-emphasized, in response to sharp opposition from
medical organizations,3 0 recommendations appear to remain under
consideration at the time of this writing for the facilitation of pilot
studies,3 l which may be all that Professor Weiler himself would rec-
29. See, e.g., Weiler, supra note 4, at 941 n. 98. Compare the views of Ira Magaziner,
the White House Senior Adviser for Policy Development: "Although it was never the
centerpiece of our proposal, we were going to move toward enterprise liability because
we viewed it as one way to promote better quality .... [W]e got a lot of feedback from
doctors who were nervous .... We respected that feedback and in response, we are
going to encourage piloting to see if enterprise liability does work." JI'hite House Reform
Goal. Promote Autonomy, AM. MED. NEWS, July 5, 1993, at 3, 40.
30. See supra note 29.
31. See supra note 29; see also Brian McCormick, Lawyers, Consumers 'ow Tort Reform
Fight, AM. MED. NEWS, July 26, 1993, at 3. Cf. Dana Priest, White House Considers AMA's
Prescription for Malpractice Relief, WASH. POST, June 12, 1993, at A8 ("White House offi-
cials said yesterday that enterprise liability had been scrapped because reaction to the
idea 'was not affirmative.' "); David Rodgers, Initial Clinton Medical Malpractice Reform Plan
Pulled After Resistance by Entrenched Interests, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1993, at A20 ("[Days
before Mrs. Clinton went before the AMA Sunday, the White House signaled that 'en-
terprise liability' was no longer a viable option beyond some potential demonstration
prospects.").
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ommend as a first step.
But consider the context. If the Clinton health care reform
package were to be adopted, presumably the objective would be that
it should provide for universal and adequate health care. Under the
Weiler proposals for offset of collateral benefits, the institutions
whose liability would be substituted for that of individual physicians
would be immunized from liability for the entire health care compo-
nent of the costs of injuries that are negligently inflicted, because all
those health care costs would have been picked up by the compre-
hensive health care program. Non-economic loss would on the
whole be noncompensable. What deterrent would be left? The cost
of two-thirds of lost wages, less a two-month deductible, up to a
maximum of twice the average wage in the state? Would even this
level of compensation extend for more than ten months, in the case
of the most severely disabled? After a year of total disability, I have
been reminded by a colleague,3" Social Security disability payments
become available.33 Would they then also be deducted from the
wage-loss compensation? If the psychological assumptions of eco-
nomics are really an adequate explanation of human behavior, one
might be driven to question the rationality of the medical profession
in opposing such enterprise liability proposals." Conversely, of
course, if practical politics is the explanation for the proposal for
offset of collateral benefits, the question may be put whether legisla-
tors are likely to consider liability so attenuated to constitute a cred-
ible deterrence package.
There is, of course, another element in deterrence beside the
average amount of compensation per claimant. This amount must
be multiplied by the number of successful claimants to calculate the
total tab for the liable party. The most striking finding of the
Harvard study of New York hospital records is the large number of
malpractice victims who never file claims.35 It is on this finding that
Professor Weiler appears to rely as a major justification for the
changes he advocates. The political problem, moreover, to which
he attributes the need for the offset of collateral-source benefits, is
32. I am indebted to Professor David S. Bogen on this point.
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1) (1988); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.315, 404.1505 (1993).
34. Physicians may, of course, be worried about more than malpractice liability pre-
miums. They are already concerned by the increasing encroachments on their profes-
sional autonomy that have been imposed upon them by non-medical bureaucracies.
The prospect of the role to be played by the risk-management personnel of hospitals, in
furtherance of the deterrence objectives of the enterprise liability proposal, may well be
distasteful for reasons that transcend economics.
35. See, e.g., Weiler, supra note 4, at 912-913, 918.
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based on an estimate of the total costs of liability if all eligible claim-
ants were paid.36 That so many claimants who would be eligible
under the present system do not file claims now appears to be the
result, at least in large measure, of their ignorance that they have
been negligently injured in the course of treatment.37 A surmise
that more of these patients will be compensated under the Weiler
enterprise liability proposal depends on the assumption that more
potential claims will be identified under that proposal than are iden-
tified now.
Here, amplification of the proposal would be welcome. It
would be interesting to understand better how it would come about
that more patients would learn about potential claims, or that hospi-
tals would take an initiative in making compensation in the absence
of claims by patients. Some such increase is understandable if pro-
vision is made for automatic compensation for certain designated
unexpected outcomes, regardless of fault.3' Nevertheless, it is not
evident how the major shortcoming today, the ignorance of the pa-
tient about the contribution of avoidable treatment errors to his
condition, would be much changed under the enterprise liability
proposal. Professor Weiler suggests that Swedish experience indi-
cates a greater willingness of doctors to explain potential claims to
patients where liability is divorced from fault.3 ' But the Swedish
scheme, as I understand it, is essentially a first-party program, not a
liability plan.4 My willingness to help you understand a claim you
may have against your insurer does not, I think, signify an equal
willingness to help you understand a claim against my employer,
particularly if the claim is for serious avoidable harm caused by my
negligence. Accordingly, a better explanation of whether, and if so,
why the number of patients likely to be paid would approximate the
number of patients who should be eligible for payment would be
helpful for an evaluation of both the deterrence effect of the Weiler
enterprise liability proposal, and of the justification for the calcula-
tions that are deemed to necessitate the immunization of responsi-
36. Id. at 949.
37. Id. at 913. There can, of course, be other reasons, such as the loyalty of grateful
patients who are convinced of the good faith and concern of their physicians.
38. Id. at 933-34.
39. Id. at 927.
40. See WERNER PHENNIGSTORF WITH DONALD G. GIFFORD, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
LIABILITY LAW AND COMPENSATION SCHEMES IN TEN COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES
58, 168, 185 (1991); Edgar Borgenhammer, Patients' Rights and hIforn ed Consent: Swedish
Experience, 12 J. CONSUMER POL'y 277, 280 (1989).
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ble institutions from health care costs that are compensated by
collateral sources.
The context of the health care reform program within which the
enterprise liability proposal is to be considered provides a further
paradox. Not only does the health care program diminish the effec-
tiveness of the enterprise liability scheme for purposes of deter-
rence. It also diminishes the need for a change in the locus of
liability for compensatory purposes. To the extent that the health
care component of the harm caused by malpractice is to be covered
anyway by the health care program, the need to make the liability
program function better in order to pay for these costs more com-
prehensively is eliminated.4 Professor Weiler may therefore en-
counter the same problem that has stalled Professor O'Connell's
reform efforts. Big changes that are tough politically are not en-
acted in pursuit of modest goals. As the practical benefits of the
enterprise liability proposal for both compensatory purposes and
deterrence are diminished in proportion to the effectiveness of the
health care reform package in the context of which it is presented,
the remaining advantages of the proposal appear increasingly one-
sided in favor of the medical community, whose present liability sys-
tem costs could be substantially reduced in most jurisdictions.42
But, as we have seen,43 these beneficiaries are, for whatever reason,
among the principal opponents of the proposal.
This does not, of course, begin to do justice to Professor Wei-
ler's proposals. They do not require my endorsement. His own dis-
cussion provides all the support they need. Our medical
malpractice system is certainly improvable, and Professor Weiler has
provided the most important contemporary discussion of which I
know about why it should be changed and how it may be possible to
do so. My only suggestion is that the mix in which he has assembled
his proposals may have been more suitable to the overall social con-
text that existed before the Clinton health care proposals than it
would be in the context that could develop if a wide-ranging health
care reform program were to be adopted. This is not to say that
Professor Weiler's proposals would each then lose its force, but only
that the arrangement of the components he has analyzed, for no-
41. For a similar perspective in a somewhat different context, compare Kenneth S.
Abraham, Adopting Comparative Negligence: Some Thoughts for the Late Reformer, 41 MD. L.
REV. 300, 307-11 (1982).
42. There could be limitations to these reductions in jurisdictions that already ex-
clude collateral-source payments, and impose caps on non-economic damages.
43. See supra notes 29-31.
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fault, for cost containment, and for organizational liability, could in
that context benefit from reshuffling and reformulation.
Other papers in this collection are equally rich, each in its own
way. On behalf of the Torts and Compensation Section of the
AALS, I would like to express my appreciation to all the contribu-
tors to this Symposium, and to Kamil Ismail, Esq. and his colleagues
on the editorial board of the Maryland Law Review, for an unusually
valuable contribution to the scholarship of accident law. The par-
ticipants have, I believe, embellished the record of the AALS as a
learned society, as well as enriching the understanding and stimulat-
ing the imagination of their auditors and readers. We are all in-
debted to all of them.
